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INTRODUCTION

A worldwide renaissance in federalism and individual rights has
gathered momentum during the past twenty years. Constitutional reformers in Canada, India, Nigeria, Switzerland, Australia, and, most
recently, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have demanded increased autonomy for the major subunits (the states and provinces)
of their national governments as a way of promoting greater individual
liberty.1 At least as measured by constitutional creation and amend-

*Dean of the Henry Kendall College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and Professor of History
and Law, University of Tulsa. Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1972; M.S.L., Yale Law School,
1980. The author wishes to thank the Indiana University Press for permission to publish this
version of "Of Floors and Ceilings: The New Federalism and State Bills of Rights" from the
book entitled The Bill of Rights in Modern America, edited by David J. Bodenhaner and James
W. Ely, Jr., published by Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993.
1. James A. Thomas, State ConstitutionalLaw: The Quiet Revolution, 20 U.W. AUSTL.
L. REV. 311, 313 (1990).
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ment, judicial decisions, scholarly publications, and official reports,
these advocates of reform have concluded that in order for liberty to
be genuinely secure the states as well as the nation must guard it.
These recent developments, of course, draw strength from a classical
tradition of constitutionalism: local responsibility for liberty offers the
best check on the tyranny of a centralized government.
II.

FEDERALISM OLD AND NEW

The American phase of this reform movement has been labeled
the "New Federalism" or simply the state-law revolution. The "old"
federalism began in the era of the New Deal, when Franklin D.
Roosevelt's appointees to the Supreme Court relied on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to nationalize selected portions
of the Bill of Rights. This process reached a crescendo during the
chief justiceship of Earl Warren (1953-1969), when the Supreme Court
expansively interpreted federal authority with regard to racial equality, freedom of speech, press, and conscience, and the rights of the
accused. 2 By the 1970s, however, the state-law revolution was under
way, as judges of the highest state appellate courts invoked their own
constitutions and bills of rights to protect individual rights.3 In the
architecture of the New Federalism, the Supreme Court, interpreting
the Bill of Rights, sets the minimum floor for rights, while state
4
supreme courts, interpreting their state bills of rights, fix the ceiling.
The "New Federalism" has had significant impact and broad support. Ronald K.L. Collins, a leading authority on state constitutional
law, has counted more than 600 opinions since 1970 by the highest
courts of the states that have gone "beyond the federal minimum
standards on individual rights issues. ' 5 Former Supreme Court Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. and Judge Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme
Court have done more than any other jurisprudential figures to spark
this reassertion of state-based constitutional rights.6 As early as 1961,

2.

See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 327-49 (1982).

3.

See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,

90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).

4. William F. Swindler, Minimum Standardsof ConstitutionalJustice: FederalFloor and
State Ceiling, 49 Mo. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
5. Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State CourtRevolution, 74 JUDICATURE
190, 190-97 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 3, at 489-504. See also Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 197-237 (1976) (recognizing the assertion of state-based
constitutional rights as an imperative).
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Justice Brennan urged state supreme courts to apply their bills and
declarations of rights in ways that go "beyond that required of the
national government by the corresponding federal guarantee. ' 7 In
1977, Justice Brennan went even further by warning that "our liberties
cannot survive if the states betray the trust the Court has put in
them."8 California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk, another
pioneer in the state-law revolution, has ironically concluded that the
new enthusiasm for state bills of rights is justified since, unlike the
George Wallace era, "[t]oday states' rights are associated with increased, not lessened individual guarantees." 9 Even the press has
seized on the "New Federalism," with the New York Times pronouncing on its front page that "On Rights, New York Looks to State, Not
U.S. Law."'10
III.

THE POLITICS OF THE STATE-LAW REVOLUTION

Since the 1960s, the pulse of the "New Federalism" has quickened
appreciably with both liberals and conservatives seeking to arrest the
further centralization of authority in the nation's capital. Republican
Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush, for
example, have insisted that the best way to curb the national government generally and the Supreme Court specifically is to return power
- and responsibilities - to the states, especially to state legislatures.
This vision of the state-law revolution stressed the popular and
majoritarian aspects of state constitutions instead of their value as
charters of fundamental law and minority rights. It stems from the
historic belief that popular consent and control form the basis of state
constitutions. This tradition is sufficiently strong in state government
today that most appellate judges are elected by one means or another
and hold limited terms of office; most state constitutions are susceptible
to amendment by initiative; and most legislatures are the engines of
state government." The stress laid on popular consent and control
also affirms the historic role of state constitutions in filling the gaps

7. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN,

JR., THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES

20 (1961).

8. Brennan, supra note 3, at 503.
9. Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutionsin ProtectingIndividualLiberty, 8 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 651, 662 (1988).

10. Elizabeth Kolbert, On Rights, New York Looks to State, Not U.S. Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1990, at Al.

11. Kermit L. Hall, Why We Don'tElectFederalJudges, 10 THis CONST. 20, 20-26 (1986).
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in the "incomplete" federal Constitution.12 The federal document cannot
be understood or activated without reference to state constitutions.
Through their police powers, state legislatures have defined and implemented many provisions of the United States Constitution while
structuring the potentially vast powers reserved to them and to the
people by that organic law.
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, an appointee of President
Nixon, added judicial support to this position by insisting that the
tension in state constitutions between popular will and fundamental
law should be resolved in favor of the former. Chief Justice Burger
agreed that greater authority should be returned to the states but he
also worried that state court judges might actually interpret their
respective state constitutions in ways that would "require more than
the Federal Constitution.' ' 13 Chief Justice Burger insisted that the
states, especially when the rights of criminal defendants were involved,
should conform their bills of rights with federal constitutional requirements through the amending process rather than relying on what he
denounced as judicial lawmaking.14 The specter of judicially expanded
state-based constitutional freedoms raised Chief Justice Burger's hackles because it threatened popular consent and control as the
touchstones of state government.
At the same time, political liberals and advocates of civil liberties,
such as Justice Brennan, have de-emphasized the tradition of popular
consent and control and stressed instead the importance of state constitutions as fundamental law. 15 When properly interpreted by state
high court judges, Justice Brennan and others argue, state bills of
rights promise not only to check the centralizing tendencies of the
national government, but to protect minority rights by limiting state
legislative discretion.16 Political liberals, who once praised the virtues
of centralized authority and federal judicial review of state actions,
have pragmatically adapted their views to suit the new political
realities.17 After all, the liberal discovery of state courts and state

12. Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 27, 38-42 (1982).
13. See Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
14. See id. at 637-39 (Burger, J., concurring).
15. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 495.
16. Id. at 491, 495.
17. See Sol Wachtler, Constitutional Rights: Resuming the States' Role, 15 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Summer 1989, at 23, 23-25.
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bills of rights coincided with the ideological transformation wrought
by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush in the membership of the
United States Supreme Court. More than their counterparts during
the heyday of the Warren Court, the new Republican appointees to
the high bench have displayed considerable sympathy for state legislative initiatives. Confronted with a Supreme Court unwilling to sustain the due process revolution, Justice Brennan and others have
turned to state courts and state constitutions. Viewed from this angle,
the "New Federalism" promises, through state judicial review, to
empower groups otherwise neglected by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts.
Whatever one's political views, this new attention to state constitutional law is welcome, if for no other reason than that it has been
neglected for so long. The story of our federal constitutional history
has been explained from the top-down rather than the bottom up.
This top-down perspective has been encouraged by the stability of the
national government and the difficulty of generalizing about constitutional developments in fifty different states. The United States, after
all, has had only one constitutional convention (in Philadelphia in 1787);
the states have had more than 230 separate conventions. 18 Since the
beginning of the republic there has never been a three-year period in
which at least one state constitutional convention has met.19 The fifty
states have operated under no fewer than 146 different constitutions,
with most states having had two or more. 20 Through 1988 more than
8,000 amendments have been proposed and more than 5,000 of these
21
have actually been added to the organic laws of the states.

IV.

STATE

BILLS OF RIGHTS, THE SUPREME COURT,
NINETEENTH-CENTURY FEDERALISM

AND

In one sense, the state-law revolution is no revolution at all, since
from the beginning of the nation state bills of rights have figured
prominently in the history of liberty. Even as they wrote a constitution
designed to strengthen the central government, most of the delegates
to the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 turned to state constitutions

18. Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State
Constitutions, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 388,

394 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 394-95.
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and bills of rights for models.2 The Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 is the world's oldest written democratic constitution still in force.2
Vermont drafted a written declaration of rights fourteen years before
it was admitted to the Union in 1791. 24 The drafters of the federal
Bill of Rights, moreover, borrowed extensively from their state experiences, which in turn derived from the strong conventual tradition in
the colonies.? That tradition included the Mayflower Compact of 1620,
the charters of the original colonies, and later town covenants of the
early American frontier. 26 All of the rights eventually recognized in
the federal Bill of Rights had previously been spelled out in one or
more of these early documents. The legacy of rights runs deep in the
states.
State bills of rights retained their importance throughout the
nineteenth century despite the presence of the first ten amendments
in the new federal Constitution. The vitality of state-based rights was
due, at least in part, to the frailty of the federal government, described
by Alexander Hamilton as "at a distance and out of sight."- During
the Philadelphia Convention, for example, Oliver Ellsworth, a future
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, expressed the views of most of
his contemporaries when he concluded that it was from state governments "alone [that] he could derive the greatest happiness he expect[ed] in this life" 8 and to state constitutions that he expected to
turn "for the preservation of his rights."- Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, argued that the new Constitution did no harm to the state
documents; if anything, it gave them greater currency.3 0 He insisted
that, "The State Declarations of Rights are not replead by this Con'
stitution; and being in force are sufficient. 31
The members of the First Congress in 1789-1790 reinforced this
commitment to state bills of rights during the debate over the federal
Bill of Rights. Given the opportunity to do otherwise, they chose to
apply the first ten amendments only against the federal government,

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

L. HALL, THE MAGIC
Id. at 62.
VT.CONST. of 1777 ch. I.
KERMIT

MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY

68 (1989).

22, 62 (1988).
Id. at 19-20.
THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 176 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 492 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
Id.
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 618 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
Id.
DONALD LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
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not the states. James Madison, the architect of both the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, believed so strongly that popularly based state
constitutions would be inadequate to protect minority rights that he
urged that most of the federal Bill of Rights should apply against the
states as well as the national government.H Accordingly, his proposed
Bill of Rights provided that "no State shall violate the equal rights
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases.'"
The Senate rejected Madison's wording, in part because the senators were jealous for the prerogatives of their states. This action,
however, also expressed a tradition of constitutional government that
equated liberty with popular consent and control and individual happiness with a close relationship between the people and their government. Bills of rights, in this regard, were more important as means
of protecting majorities against abuse by government than protecting
minorities from the excesses of popular majorities. Most senators
either did not understand or rejected as unfounded Madison's concern
with majority tyranny.
Throughout the nineteenth century the Supreme Court applied the
Bill of Rights only against the national government, even though a
handful of radical lawyers and judges argued that it was intended to
limit the states as well.37 Chief Justice John Marshall seemingly erased
any doubts with his opinion in Barron v. City of Baltimore.3 That
case raised the question of whether John Barron might recover damages under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when improvements made by the City of Baltimore rendered a wharf he owned
unusable. 39 Chief Justice Marshall rebuffed Barron's claim and directed
him to seek relief based on the Maryland Constitution.40
Marshall's opinion was nonetheless controversial in some quarters.
On one level, of course, it confirmed the wishes of the framers by
preserving the state-centered scheme of protecting rights. In doing

32.

Kermit Hall, Introduction, in BY AND FOR
22-23 (Kermit Hall ed., 1991).
See id. at 20.
Id.
See id. at 21.
See Hall, supm note 18, at 396.
See HALL, supra note 22, at 71.
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Id. at 243-47.
Id. at 250-51.

THE PEOPLE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN

AMIERICAN HISTORY

33.
34:
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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so, however, the opinion also raised portentous issues concerning the
future of another institution of property, slavery - the abolition of
it in the South, the control of it in the new territories, and the ability
of the Northern states, under their own constitutional authority, to
free fugitive slaves from their masters. 41 Antislavery advocates, such
as Lysander Spooner of Boston, mocked the notion that state bills of
rights, subject as they were to popular consent and control, could
ever provide adequate grounds to end the peculiar institution or keep
fugitive slaves from their masters' clutches. 2 Instead, Spooner pleaded
for the federal judiciary to apply the Bill of Rights directly against
43
the states.
The proslavery forces frustrated this line of development because
of the control they exercised over the federal courts. Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney's opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford- and Ableman
v. Booth45 drove home this political truth. His opinion in Dred Scott
affirmed the property rights of masters in their slaves and held that
Congress could do nothing that would disturb those rights.4 6 In effect,
Taney had nationalized the Fifth Amendment provision against the
taking of property, in this instance slave property.
Taney's opinion in Booth was important because it called into question the concept of state-based rights that Marshall had seemingly
approved in Barron. Sherman Booth, a Wisconsin abolitionist editor,
was charged with violating the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 by aiding
a runaway Negro. 47 While technically held by federal authorities, Booth
was actually placed in a local jail.4 From there he secured a writ of
habeas corpus under Wisconsin law from a state judge who also declared the Federal Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional.49 The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed both actions only to have Taney and his
brethren overturn its decision. 0 The Chief Justice not only ridiculed
the idea that state courts could declare a federal law unconstitutional,

41.

See

PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COM-

ITY 265-67 (1991).

42.

See WILLIAM M. WIECEK,

THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN

AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 227, 257-58, 260, 263 (1977).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 263-65.
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
62 U.S. 506 (1858).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450-55.
Booth, 62 U.S. at 507.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509, 526.
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but he dismissed as well the notion that state courts, where fugitive
slaves were involved, were free to interpret their constitutions without
regard to the federal document.5 1
As Paul Finkelman has observed, taken together, these decisions
meant that as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law,
slavery, fugitive slaves, and those persons who aided them were
beyond the pale of both state and federal bills of rights.5 Masters, on
the other hand, could claim an apparently nationalized protection for
their property free from state constitutional control"
V. THE POST-CIVIL WAR REVOLUTION IN FEDERALISM AND THE
DOCTRINE OF ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,5 raised anew
the question supposedly answered in Barron about whether the Bill
of Rights applied against the states. Along with it came the equally
tangled problem of when state courts could rely on their own bills of
rights to determine the constitutionality of state executive and legislative acts.
The Fourteenth Amendment granted significant new authority to
the national government to prevent the states from interfering with
due process of law, equal protection of the law, and privileges and
immunities." The Supreme Court initially held that the state action
provision of the amendment did not incorporate (that is, bring under
the scope of the amendment) the various guarantees of the Bill of
Rights." By the 1890s, however, the states were again turning to
their own police powers to deal with a major policy issue, in this
instance the social and economic costs associated with massive industrialization. Once again the Justices rebuked state legislative action.
In the landmark case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v.
City of Chicago, 7 the Justices, as the earlier Taney Court had done
with fugitive slavery, proscribed state legislative authority." Brushing
aside Marshall's opinion in Barron, they held that the Due Process

51.

Id. at 517-20.

52.

See FINKELMiAN, supra note 41, at 229-84.

53.

Id.

54. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
The Slaugterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Id. at 258.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to a state's taking of
private property. 59 Over the course of the next seventy-five years the
Justices selectively incorporated most of the Bill of Rights against the
states.
The Fourteenth Amendment and the subsequent adoption of the
doctrine of selective incorporation threatened the traditional scheme
of federalism in which the states had primary responsibility for protecting rights. The Justices addressed this matter for the first time in
Murdock v. City of Memphis.- The Murdock Court held that short
of xplicit congressional authorization, the Court would not overturn
state decisions reached on separate state grounds, as long as those
decisions did not conflict with the federal Constitution.61 The Court
in Murdock developed the doctrine of adequate and independent state
grounds.62 Under this doctrine a state court's interpretation of a state
law or a state constitution is adequate if the interpretation is sufficient
to support the judgment and does not violate the federal Constitution.6
It is independent if the result is reached on the basis of state interpretation that is not dependent on federal constitutional law.- In essence,
the Court in Murdock gave state judges the power to expand liberties
within their jurisdiction well beyond the standards required by the
United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution and federal laws. These same state judges were prohibited under Murdock
from restricting rights to such a degree that doing so would violate
federally protected rights.6
VI.

DEMAND AND RESPONSE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Nineteenth-century state bills of rights developed independently
of United States Supreme Court decisions, responding as they did so
to social, economic, and political demands. Any generalizations about
their development is subject to alteration because of the great variety
of state experience. Still, patterns do emerge, and those patterns cast
the state-law revolution in a somewhat more sober light than do this
revolution's more enthusiastic proponents.

59.

Id. at 233-36, 241.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

87 U.S. 590 (1874).
Id. at 634-37.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Popular consent and control tended to override principles of fundamental law in nineteenth-century state constitutions. Throughout the
century, these documents and their accompanying bills of rights grew
longer and longer, filled with seemingly endless details that diminished
their value as organic, fundamental laws.6 With each passing decade,
they came increasingly to resemble super-legislation. For example,
the decision by Wyoming constitution-makers in 1890 to proscribe
certain school textbooks affirmed that whoever controlled the course
of constitutional change could also mold constitutionally mandated
rights . Politicians frustrated by the regular legislative process turned
to constitutional conventions and the amending process as ways of
securing otherwise unattainable social and economic objectives. As the
girth of state constitutions swelled, they became more like codes of
law than fundamental frames of government. This process diluted the
substantive content of bills of rights by adding more and more provisions while diminishing their rhetorical power by promising more than
they could deliver.
The comparative brevity of the federal Constitution has been a
source of its strength. It is composed of approximately 7,300 words;
only the Vermont Constitution among the states is today shorter at
an estimated 6,600 words.6 In 1776 the average length of state constitutions was 7,150 words; by 1900 it had ballooned to approximately69
29,000 words, somewhat greater than the 27,000-word average today.
Nineteenth-century state constitutions became remarkably pliable
documents of modest age that increasingly paled before the federal
Constitution as stable representations of fundamental principles and
timeless structures designed to distribute and protect rights fairly.
The emphasis on popular consent and control also eroded the independence of nineteenth-century state supreme courts, the major interpreters of state constitutions. The Justices of the federal Supreme
Court were appointed for terms of good behavior; their independence
enabled them to found the institution of judicial review and promote
the idea that they alone could conclusively interpret the federal Bill
of Rights. The state appellate judiciary developed in exactly the opposite way. Beginning in the 1840s, state constitutional reformers succeeded in making most of the highest judgeships elective offices filled

66.

See Hall, supra note 18, at 394-95.

67. WYO. CONST. of 1890, art. VII, § 11.
68. VT. CONST.; see also Hall, supra note 18, at 395.
69. Hall, supra note 18, at 395.
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for limited terms rather than appointive positions held during good
behavior.- Local majorities were able to shape the meaning of state
bills of rights through pressure brought at the ballot box on elected
judges as well as through constitutional conventions and the amending
process.7 1
The result was variety in the rights enumerated in the state documents, interpretations of the scope of those rights that often differed
from state to state, and even instances when rights that were enumerated, such as freedom of speech and press, were not enforced,
nor violations litigated. Not until 1931, in Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
O1son, did the United States Supreme Court incorporate the First
Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Until then constitutional protection of speech fell exclusively under state bills of rights. Even though every state constitution
enumerated it as a right, there are only a handful of reported state
cases dealing with freedom of speech during the entire century.3 The
one right that we consider the most fundamental to democratic selfgovernance today was barely enforced as a matter of nineteenth-century state constitutional law. In the pre-Civil War era, moreover,
several state courts (both North and South) interpreted the speech
and press clauses of their constitutions in ways that muzzled
abolitionist and antislavery advocates.7 4
The status of religious freedom during the nineteenth century offers
another example of the way in which state bills of rights often yielded
before majoritarian social pressures. As G. Alan Tarr has explained,
the new American states did not so much guarantee freedom of religion
as they regularized the relationship between church and state within
their borders. 5 While state-established churches persisted, early constitution-makers framed bills of rights that repudiated the colonial
practices of government, which either infringed worship by faiths other
than the established church or lent support to collect taxes for that
church.7 6 As Tarr reminds us, the liberal Pennsylvania Constitution

70.
Elected
71.
72.
73.

Kermit Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitution Reform and the Rise of an
Judiciary1846-1860, 44 HISTORIAN 354, 354-57 (1983).
Id.
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
TIMOTHY W.

GLEASON,

THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE COURTS

12, 39 (1990).
74. Id. at 49-51.
75. G. Alan Tarr, Religion Under State Constitutions, 496 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. &
Soc. ScI. 65, 65-75 (1988).
76. Id. at 66.
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
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of 1776 set the standard for the nineteenth century, although some
states adopted its precepts sooner than others.77 The Pennsylvania
document guaranteed that
all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences
and understanding; and that no man ought or of right can
be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or
support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent.78
Nineteenth-century constitution-makers also recognized the existence of God and the dependence of the state on God's favor. The New
Jersey Constitution of 1844, for example, attributed both the civil and
religious liberty of the state directly to the guiding hand of God. 79
This provision, however, offered scant protection to nonbelievers,
which is exactly what its framers intended.80 The prevailing assumption
was that government protected religion generally and Protestant
Christianity in particular. Religion clauses in state constitutions reinforced the impact of religion on society and government while simultaneously blunting the intrusion by government into the religious
sphere. Prevailing interpretations of state bills of rights, therefore,
permitted government officials to prosecute individual blasphemers of
the Protestant Church and store merchants who insisted on doing
business on Sunday. 81

By the 1850s, the ethnic and religious upheavals generated by
increasing foreign immigration inspired state constitution-makers to
reformulate bills of rights' provisions about religion. The leaders of
the emerging Roman Catholic Church in New York City and Boston,
for example, insisted that public education served to indoctrinate students in the Protestant ethic to the exclusion of other religious beliefs.8
Even more importantly, they complained that public revenues should
not be used exclusively for schools that preached Protestant learning.3
The Protestant majorities in state constitutional conventions and legis-

77. Id.
78. PA.

CONST.

of 1776, art. II.

79. N.J. CONST. of 1844 pmbl.
80. See id.
81. Tarr, supra note 75, at 65-75.
82. DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAw AND
at 162-68 (1987).
83. Id.
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latures did not respond to these demands by redistributing funds;
instead, they reformulated the religion and education provisions of
their constitutions to take account of the newcomers while maintaining
Protestant hegemony." In almost every instance, eastern states
adopted constitutional language that made it a matter of right that
public funds could not be diverted for denominational purposes and
prohibited schools that received those funds from carrying out any
religious practices.8
Where the impact of immigration was less direct, traditional practices continued. The constitution of post-Civil War Mississippi, for
example, retained a requirement for Bible reading in schools. Constitution-makers in other Southern states embraced language that
either permitted or required this practice.8 The decision to include
such an item in their bills of rights suggests that without them the
practices would probably have been prohibited.
Settlers in the trans-Mississippi West carried much of their constitutional baggage with them, including attitudes toward religious
freedom. Initially, they simply mimicked their experiences from back
East. The Oregon Constitution of 1857, for example, closely paralleled
its Indiana counterpart, including in almost exact form the latter's
approach to religious freedom. 8 As the West matured, however, forces
of popular consent and control began to leave their own often unique
imprint on state bills of rights. The Washington Constitution of 1889
affirmed the independence of the West by declaring that public schools
"shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence" and forbidding the expenditure of public money on any "religious worship, exercise or institution" or the "support of any religious establishment."1
Constitution-makers in the West innovated in other ways as well.
Even as a territory, Wyoming in 1869 extended the right to vote to
women;90 when the nation adopted the Nineteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1920, seventeen states west of the Mississippi River had already authorized female suffrage.91 One by one,

84. Tarr, supra note 75, at 65-75.
85. Id.
86. MIss. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 9.
87. Tarr, supra note 75, at 65-75.
88. Compare OR. CONST. art. 1, §9 2-4 (guaranteeing freedom of worship and forbidding
religious tests for office holders) with IND. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 5 (same).
89. WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 4.
90.

10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONS

461 (William F. Swindler,

ed., 1979).
91. See Mari J. Matsuda, The West and the Legal State of Women: Explanationsof Frontier
Feminism, 24 J.W. 47, 50, 54 (1985).
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the arid states of the far West followed the example set by Colorado
in 1879 when that state's constitution-makers elevated the use of water
to the status of a public property right to be distributed in the best
interests of the state.9 Taken together, these developments in the
West underscore the pragmatic tradition bequeathed by the architects
of nineteenth-century bills of rights to the twentieth century.
Popular consent and control also limited the rights guaranteed to
racial minorities. Constitutions drawn in the southern states, for example, included provisions that enslaved African Americans before the
Civil War and segregated them after Reconstruction. 93 A similar fate
befell Chinese Americans in the West, where state governments systematically denied them basic political, social, and economic rights.9
Popularly elected state supreme court justices in both sections often
turned a blind eye to such discrimination. 95
In matters of racial equality, the post-Civil War protection of liberty was at best mixed. In nearly half of the twenty cases J. Morgan
Kousser studied in Kansas and Louisiana, blacks won when they raised
issues of equal protection under various provisions of state constitutions and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.9
In Board of Education v. Tinnon,9 for example, Justice Daniel M.
Valentine of the Kansas Supreme Court rejected an effort by a school
board to segregate children on the basis of race because the 'tendency
of the times is . . . to abolish all distinctions on account of race, or
color, or previous condition of servitude, and to make all persons
absolutely equal before the law."9 Justice Valentine, however, despite
arguments by counsel, did not rest his reasoning on either the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the guarantees
to equality outlined in the Kansas Constitution; instead, he addressed
only the relatively narrow ground of whether the legislature had authorized such a classification and, since it had not, whether the school

92. Kermit L. Hall, The Legal Culture of the Great Plains, 12 GREAT PLAINS Q. 86, 90-91
(1992).
93. See Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 85 n.54,
89-97 (1985).
94. See Martha Minow, Foreword:JusticeEndangered,101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 70 (1987).
95. See HALL, supra note 22, at 148-49.
96. J. Morgan Kousser, Before Plessy, Before Brown: The Development of the Law of Racial
Integration in Louisiana and Kansas, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST, supra note 18, at 213,
239-40.
97. 26 Kan. 1 (1881).
98. Id. at 18.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

board could rely on its general power to regulate the schools as a
basis upon which to segregate the schools."
In Louisiana, explicit state constitutional prohibitions against
segregation had little effect on judges willing to ignore them. Article
135 of the Louisiana Constitution required the legislature to integrate
the schools, 1°° but the state supreme court in Trevigne v. School
Board, 10 ' refused on disingenuous technical grounds to order such integration. 10
Despite the somewhat different political and legal climates in Kansas and Louisiana, by the end of the nineteenth century public officials
had embraced segregation as lawful under their constitutions, a development confirmed by the Supreme Court's famous "separate but equal"
ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson.'10 As Kousser notes, "in the end in both
states, blacks lost out because a new set of racist judges took office
and emasculated [state] constitutional guarantees."'
The heritage of nineteenth-century discrimination died hard, even
when the bills of rights appeared to affirm unequivocally equal protection and due process of law. That is one reason why in the early
twentieth century such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union,
the International Labor Defense, and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People undertook organized litigation in the
federal courts. 10 5 These groups invoked the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights before federal judges as a way of sidestepping
bloated and populistic state constitutions and elected appellate court
06
judges.
VII.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

Since World War II efforts to streamline and modernize state constitutions have actually reduced them to the point where they are on
average about three times as long as the federal Constitution.- ° Yet

99. Id. at 18-23.
100. LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135.
101. 31 La. Ann. 105 (1879).
102. See id. at 106.
103. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
104. Kousser, supra note 96, at 239.
105. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP's
EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 50-51 (1987).
106.

(1975).
107.

See

LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED

RICHARD CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY

3-17

See Hall, supra note 18, at 395.
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the substantive provisions of state bills of rights have expanded well
beyond the federal Bill of Rights.'10 As was true in the nineteenth-century, the states have been creative laboratories for testing rights.
Many state constitutions, for example, explicitly guarantee the right
to privacy, protection of and the right to enjoy natural resources and
environmental health, a right to education, and equal protection of
the laws regardless of gender. 1' 9
. The development of the right of privacy exemplifies the way constitutional revision, amendment, and judicial review have combined
to expand the scope of liberty in this century. The federal Bill of
Rights contains no explicit guarantee of privacy, either by controlling
government access to and dissemination of personal information or by
ensuring the autonomy of individuals to make fundamental and intimate decisions in such matters as childbearing, personal appearance,
medical care, sexuality, and living arrangements. The right to privacy
in the federal Constitution has been implied from the "penumbra" of
other fundamental rights that protect privacy interests, notably the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.110 Some states
have also relied on judicial interpretation to establish such a right.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, section 1,
of that state's constitution to find a right of privacy as one of the
general "rights of personality" guaranteed by that Article."' In Massachusetts, the judiciary has concluded that privacy is implicit in the
due process safeguards outlined in Article X of that state's constitution." 2
Eleven states, however, have framed the right of privacy directly
in their bills of rights. 13 Constitution-makers in California, for example, added the word "privacy" to that state's declaration of fundamental
rights;" 4 Florida adopted a specific amendment that provides that,
"Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life. .... ",15

108. Brennan, supra note 3, at 495.
109. See Developments in the Law - The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
110. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see U.S. CONST. amends. I, III-V

& IX.
111. State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339, 345 (N.J. 1977).
112. Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981).
113. Scott S. Cairns & Carolyn V. Grady, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Reasone6
Approach for Private Employers, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 491, 530 & n.227 (1990).
114. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.

115. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
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While the federal Supreme Court has been reluctant to construe
the right of privacy broadly, especially where sexual acts such as
sodomy and prostitution are involved, the states have acted with
greater boldness. The New Jersey Supreme Court has struck down
on privacy grounds state statutes prohibiting fornication and consensual sodomy.116 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1980 voided that
state's "voluntary deviate sexual intercourse" statute on the grounds
that "[s]piritual leadership, not the government, has the responsibility
for striving to improve the morality of individuals.111 7 Moreover, sev-

eral states, most notably California, have interpreted their privacy
provisions to impose an obligation of neutrality on state governments
in dealing with matters of procreation. The California Supreme Court,
in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,118 overturned
a statute that excluded abortion coverage from the medical assistance
9
programs for the indigent.1

Freedom of expression has also benefitted from greater state constitutional protection in this century. Take, for example, New York,
which has long been a center of the press and the arts. Its bill of
rights provides that "[elvery citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge that
liberty of speech or of the press."'120 The New York Court of Appeals
has construed these words to give protections well beyond those afforded by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment. 121 Under existing federal constitutional law, a state
can shut down a bookstore if its patrons are engaging in illegal acts,
even though the store owner may be innocent of any wrongdoing.New York judges, however, have taken a broader view.'1 In that
state, as former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of the Court of Appeals
has written, the question is not "who is aimed at but who is hit."''
"Because the closing will affect the bookstore, which is entitled to
constitutional protection ...

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

the state must show that no other meas-

Saunders, 381 A.2d at 341; see also State v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748, 752-54 (N.J. 1973).
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980).
625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
Id. at 799.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
Wachtler, supra note 17, at 24.
Id. (citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986)).
Id. (citing People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986)).
Id.
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ures, such as prosecution of the offending patrons, will eliminate the
nuisance before it can order the store closed."'
VIII.

THE LIMITS OF STATE BILLS OF RIGHTS

As these examples demonstrate, the "New Federalism" has expanded liberty through the doctrine of adequate and independent state
grounds. Not only do state constitutions contain a greater number of
rights, but state appellate court judges have recently interpreted them
in ways that raise the ceiling of rights above the minimum floor established by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Yet, skepticism about
the state-law revolution is in order, a skepticism rooted in not only
the checkered history of state-based liberty in the nineteenth century
but also the realities of modern federalism. Indeed, there is reason
to question whether the "New Federalism," at least from the perspective of liberal advocates such as Brennan and Linde, can shoulder the
burden they have placed on it.
Criminal defendants' rights is one area of the "New Federalism"
where the states seem, on first impression, to have pushed well beyond
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Recent studies have shown that
state courts in hundreds of decisions have gone beyond the federal
requirements and that more than one-third of all rulings in this area
126
by the Supreme Court are subsequently liberalized by the states.
New York offers a good example. Its constitution makes the same
guarantee of assistance of counsel to a person charged with a crime
as does the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
most important recent issue involving this right has not been whether
it exists, but at what point it attaches before formal charges have
been made. Arguably, individuals may be most vulnerable to police
questioning during the early phases of the investigation process, usually well before formal charges have been made. Under the famous
Warren Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona,m the police are required only to advise the defendant of the right to counsel before
questioning begins. The New York Court of Appeals, however, has
read that state's constitutional guarantee to counsel more expansively.m Once an attorney representing a person appears, the person
cannot subsequently be questioned unless the attorney is also pres-

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
See, e.g., Latzer, supra note 5, at 192-93.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Wachtler, supra note 17, at 24.
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ent. 12 The court has interpreted this rule to mean that, once an individual has requested counsel, questioning cannot proceed at any stage
in the process without a lawyer present.1 -° The New York standard
not only exceeds the federal constitutional requirement, but it is probably the toughest in the country. 131 In New York, a person put in a
lineup has a right to counsel; under the Sixth Amendment the same
person, unless formally charged, would not have that same right.'2
Relying on this and similar examples from other states is somewhat
misleading. If one out of three Supreme Court rulings involving the
rights of criminal defendants have been rejected by state high courts
since the 1960s, then two-thirds have been adopted. 133 As Barry Latzer

has argued, the "New Federalism" contains much of the same hidden
conservatism associated with nineteenth-century state constitutional
law. 13

These developments are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. The first
presents the ten states that have been most active in relying on state
bill of rights' provisions involving defendants' rights and the ten least
active.1 As Latzer persuasively argues, not only have state high
courts adopted most of the significant changes brought about by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts in the area of rights of criminal defendants, but the high courts of Connecticut and New Hampshire have
done so even though they are usually portrayed as pioneers of the
state-law revolution. 136 As Table 2 suggests, more than two-fifths (44%)
of all state courts have readily adopted federal constitutional
guidelines, while less than one-tenth (8%) have routinely gone beyond
the federal mandates. 137 Even those states that actively interpret their
bill of rights provisions covering criminal defendants are likely to fall
between these two extremes.
In the two states -

California and Florida -

with the highest

crime rates in the country and the highest rates of rejecting federal
guidelines,138 the tradition of popular consent and control has nonethe-

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976)).

(citing People v. Coleman, 371 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1977)).
Latzer, supra note 5, at 192.
at 190.
at 193.
at 191, 194.
at 193.
at 193, 197.
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less shaped defendants' rights. Constitutional initiatives in both states
in 1982 resulted in the addition of anti-exclusionary rule amendments
to their respective constitutions.139 The exclusionary rule provides that
evidence illegally seized can be excluded from the prosecution of a
criminal defendant. The California and Florida amendments require
that search and seizure provisions of these states' constitutions be
construed in accordance with the interpretation given by the Fourth
0
Amendment by an increasingly conservative federal Supreme Court.14
These figures suggest that a more critical and realistic assessment
of the supposed revolution in state constitutional rights of criminal
defendants is in order. The "New Federalism" is not nearly as liberal
as it is often portrayed, since in two cases out of three the highest
courts of the states have followed the path already marked out by
the "conservative" Burger and Rehnquist Courts.'4' The movement
toward independent state constitutional doctrine, something strongly
urged by former Justice Brennan and Judge Linde, is unlikely to
succeed, at least in the highly touted area of the rights of criminal
defendants. That result is likely in part because these courts are
clearly susceptible to public concern over violent crime, a fact of life
driven home in 1986 when California voters recalled Chief Justice
Rose Bird and two other justices because they were widely perceived
as being soft on criminals.'4
Moreover, state court judges invariably end up, at least in the
area of criminal procedure, dealing with issues that the Supreme Court
has already treated. Since state courts must always consider the federal floor provided by rights, they necessarily must take account of
federal constitutional requirements. Those guidelines leave state
courts vulnerable to second-guessing on supremacy clause issues.
The repeated refrain that "separate state grounds" can free state
courts from control by the Supreme Court is also questionable. In
theory, at least, state supreme courts can immunize their decisions
by resting them squarely on state law. The Supreme Court in Michigan
v. Long, 43 as Latzer reminded us, exacted a price for this independence
by requiring that the states sharply differentiate their state and federal
law decisions and conform any use of federal law to applicable Supreme

139. Id. at 192-93; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
140. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; see Latzer, supra note 5, at 192-93.
141. Latzer, supra note 5, at 192-93.
142. Philip Hager, Swift Choice for Bird Seat Vowed, Experts Expect Court Changes to
Be Gradual, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, at 1 (Home Edition).
143. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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Court rulings. - Under Long, if any part of a decision rests on federal
constitutional law, then the Supreme Court may review the entire
case. 145 Most students of the constitutional system believe that the
relationship between federal and state constitutional protections is too
symbiotic to leave state courts much more authority than they already
have. Only the sheer volume of state-based cases and the inability of
the Supreme Court to hear more than a few of them prevents the
Justices from reviewing more state court actions in which federal and
state constitutional principles become mixed.
IX.

OF FLOORS AND CEILINGS

The lessons to be drawn from the history of judicially enforced
state bills of rights are two-fold. First, an important tradition of rights
has existed in the states and that tradition serves as an inspiration
today. Despite the majoritarian forces of consent and control and despite the degeneration of state constitutions into law codes filled with
super-legislation and overblown promises of rights that cannot be met,
these documents have and will continue in some instances to raise the
ceiling of rights above the federal floor. 146 It is a tribute to our federal
system that state bills of rights remain a bulwark of individual liberty.
While the states have been, from time-to-time, creative constitutional laboratories, their history is as much one of limitations as possibilities. Because state constitutions rest so heavily on popular consent
and control, only the judicially interpreted federal Bill of Rights has
commanded sufficient authority in this century to protect local
minorities in each of the states from politically dominant majorities.
We should not, of course, ignore state constitutional law. Justice Brennan has correctly noted that the federal preservation of civil liberties
sets a floor, which the states may exceed.141 This proposition is
nonetheless disturbing in both its optimism and its simplicity. It is
too optimistic because it ignores the power of the Supreme Court, as
was true with slavery and industrialization, to limit on federal grounds
the authority of the states to invoke successfully their own constitutions. It is too simplistic in that it underestimates the grip that the
tradition of popular consent and control exercises over state constitutions generally and state-based fundamental rights in particular.

144.
145.
146.
147.

See Latzer, supra note 5, at 196.
Long, 436 U.S. at 1044-45.
See Swindler, supra note 4, at 14-15,
See Brennan, supra note 3, at 495.
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There seems little doubt that the decade of the 1990s will see an
even greater output of state constitutional law rulings, but whatever
gains are made in favor of liberty will depend as well on a supportive
federal bench. We cannot hope to raise the ceiling of state constitutional rights if, at the same time, the Supreme Court lowers the
federal floor.
APPENDIX
TABLE 11
THE TEN MOST AND LEAST ACTIVE STATE
HIGH COURTS IN RELYING ON STATE BILLS OF
RIGHTS, 1968-1989
Least Active

Most Active
California
New Hampshire
Oregon
Florida
Pennsylvania
Montana
West Virginia
Connecticut
Alaska
New Jersey

Cases
43
41
28
27
27
26
25
24
22
22

South Carolina
Arkansas
Nevada
Alabama
Indiana
Minnesota
New Mexico
Virginia
Georgia
North Dakota

Cases
0
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
5
5

'This data is from Latzer, supra note 5, at 193 tbl. 2, 3.

TABLE 21
STATE HIGH COURTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND
LOWEST INCIDENCE OF ADOPTING 2
U.S. SUPREME COURT RULINGS, 1968-89
Adoption of 75% or more (22)

Rejection of 75% or more (4)
California (83%)
Alaska (82%)

IL (100%)
NE (100%)

DE (89%)
WY (88%)

KY (80%)
NH (80%)

'This data is from Latzer, supra note 5, at 193 tbl. 4.
2Latzer counted state cases which followed prior Supreme Court positions as adopting those
rulings and counted state cases with different results than similar prior Supreme Court cases
as rejecting those rulings. Latzer, supra note 5, at 192. For a complete description of Latzer
methodology, see id.
This percentage reflects only California rulings prior to the effective date of Proposition 8
which amended California's constitution to require California's courts to follow the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the exclusionary rule. Id. at 192 & tbl. 1 n.1.
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
STATE HIGH COURTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND
LOWEST INCIDENCE OF ADOPTING
U.S. SUPREME COURT RULINGS, 1968-89
Adoption of 75% or more (22)

Rejection of 75% or more (4)
Floridas (80%)
Massachusetts (75%)

IA
WI
NC
CT
MD

(94%)
(94%)
(93%)
(92%)
(92%)

MO (87%)
KS (86%)
OH (80%)
FL' (82%)
TX (81%)

ND
MI
SD
UT
ID
ME

(80%)
(79%)
(77%)
(77%)
(75%)
(75%)

4

This percentage reflects Florida rulings after the effective date of an amendment to Florida's
constitution requiring Florida courts to conform their search and seizure decisions to the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 192 & tbl. 1 n.3.
-This percentage reflects Florida rulings prior to the effective date of the amendment discussed above. Latzer, supra note 5, at 192 & tbl. 1 n.4.
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